The legacy of war exposure on political radicalization by Stephanos, Vlachos
The legacy of war exposure on political radicalization
Stephanos Vlachos∗
April 2016
Abstract. This article investigates the long-run impact of war participation on political identiﬁcation.
I make use of original data of former French citizens forcibly conscripted to the Wehrmacht during WWII.
At the end of the War these veterans, ﬁghting on the German side and commonly called the "Despite our
will", had to re-integrate a state that they felt had let them down. I ﬁnd that, in municipalities where
more men were incorporated, radical right-wing candidates still receive today more electoral support.
To establish a causal link I take advantage of a spatial discontinuity in the conscription rule. I provide
evidence that war exposure resulted in reduced diﬀuse political support amongst ex-combatants, also
known as political alienation. This attitude was transformed into observable electoral support with the
emergence of radical parties with an anti-establishment discourse. These ﬁndings suggest that particular
attention should be held on the demobilization and reintegration of veterans in war-torn countries in
order to ensure long-term political stability.
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1 Introduction
A recent OECD study has stressed the importance of political support for the implementation
of the necessary reforms following the outburst of the ﬁnancial crisis (OECD, 2013). Identiﬁ-
cation with the polity however, in the sense of the attachment or loyalty of individuals to the
∗Department of Economics (DEEP), University of Lausanne, Quartier UNIL-Dorigny, 1015 Lausanne, Switzer-
land (e-mail: stephanos.vlachos@unil.ch). I especially thank Mathias Thoenig for his advice throughout this
project. I am also grateful to Yann Algan, Johannes Buggle, Sylvain Chassang, Mathieu Couttenier, Rafael
Lalive, Hans-Joachim Voth, as well as seminar and conference participants in the University of Lausanne, the
20th SMYE, the 14th Journées LAGV, the 2016 Lisbon Meeting on Institutions and Political Economy, and the
13th ACDD for valuable comments. Angèle Oberlé provided excellent research assistance. I acknowledge ﬁnan-
cial support from the Greek State Scholarship Foundation (I.K.Y) and the University of Lausanne. This paper
features an on-line appendix containing additional results and data description.
1
political system, is not only a necessary condition for public sector reforms; it has also long
been considered a key component of political stability (Almond and Verba, 1963; Easton, 1967;
Schwartz, 1973). Such a political attitude becomes of even greater gravity when taking into
account the disastrous eﬀects of political instability on economic development (Barro and Sala-I-
Martin, 1995; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). It is therefore particularly relevant in the state-building
procedure of developing countries. Yet, several developing countries, especially in Africa, have a
long (and often ongoing) history of civil conﬂict. Understanding thus whether the experience of
individuals participating in a war leads to political identiﬁcation or estrangement, the persistence
of such attitudes, and their behavioural consequences is of central importance.
This paper provides empirical evidence of the long-run impact of war exposure on political
attitudes and their behavioural consequences. I make use of a particular historical context: the
annexation of the Eastern Borderlands of France by the Third Reich during WWII and the
consequent forcible conscription of men from these regions in the Wehrmacht1. At the end of the
War these veterans, ﬁghting on the "wrong" side and commonly called the "Despite our will"
(Malgré-nous), had to re-integrate a state that they felt had let them down.
In recent years there has been an increasing support for radical right-wing parties all over
Europe2. A key characteristic of these parties has been the building of the concept of political
establishment and their ﬁght against it (Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2001). Since the 1980s, Alsace
and Moselle have been amongst the strongholds of the radical right in France (Figure 1). My
hypothesis is that forced conscription in the German military forces led to high levels of political
alienation amongst ex-combatants once these regions were annexed back to France. This attitude
remained latent until the emergence of these parties, when it was transformed into observable
support for the radical right.
This hypothesis is in line with research in political behaviour of ex-combatants that ﬂourished
following the reports of returning Vietnam veterans maladjustments. Research in social psychol-
1The Alsace region and the Moselle department. Alsace is a region that consists of two departments: the
Bas-Rhin and the Haut-Rhin; Moselle is a department belonging to the Lorraine region. Regions are the second
level of administrative division in France (NUTS-2); departments are the third (NUTS-3). In France in 2014 there
were 27 regions consisting of 101 departments. The Alsace region and the Moselle department are simply referred
to as Alsace and Moselle from this point on.
2In this paper, radical parties are deﬁned as the ones that "radically criticize the existing social and economic
order" (Backes, 2009). In France, the National Front has increased it vote share in the European parliament
elections from 11% in 1984 to 25% in the 2014. During the same period, the Freedom Party of Austria has
increased its vote share in the National Elections from 5% (1983) to 21% (2013). Parties in Belgium (Vlaams
Blok) and Denmark (Danish People's Party) have experienced a similar electoral success.
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Figure 1: Voting Behaviour Evolution: 1965-2012
Note: Evolution of voting in France from 1965 to 2012. Data comes from the Centre de données socio-politiques, SciencesPo.
The top graph presents the evolution of abstention rates; the centre of blank and invalid ballots; the bottom of support for
radical-right wing candidates. The solid line represents the regions annexed by the Third Reich (Alsace, and Moselle); the
dashed line represents the average vote in the rest of the country.
ogy has shown that veteran alienation is a multidimensional phenomenon typically associated
with (i) frustration in readjustment to civilian life, (ii) a sense of political normlessness, (iii)
rejection of prevailing social mores, and (iv) distrust of established political authorities (Finifter,
1970). This estrangement can be either active, or passive. Active political alienation is related
to a marked hostility toward the polity; passive alienation leads to a withdrawal from political
matters (Johnson, 1976). Meanwhile, more cynical views of the conﬂict are related to high levels
of alienation (Jenning and Markus, 1977). Furthermore, individuals with the lowest levels of
political trust have been shown in favour of most radical candidates (Aberbach, 1969).
In the ﬁrst part of the paper, I combine historical evidence with administrative data and
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estimate the eﬀect of war exposure on the vote share of radical right-wing candidates. I ﬁnd
evidence that localities that vote more in favour of extreme right-wing candidates today are the
ones with the higher shares of the population actively exposed to conﬂict during the Second
World War.
An alternative explanation for these results could be that compliances rates were higher in
places that were already more radical prior to the War and that these political views still persist
today. Or that unobserved cultural traits such as religiousness are correlated both with fertility
and political conservatism. If that was the case, conscription and political preferences would be
co-determined by municipality unobservable characteristics, introducing an omitted variable bias
in the OLS estimation.
To deal with these issues I take advantage of a discontinuity in the rule determining incorpo-
ration. While cohorts born from 1908 to 1927 were drafted in Alsace only men born from 1914 to
1927 were conscripted in Moselle. I make use of this discontinuity in the conscription rule to es-
tablish an instrumental variables approach. Furthermore, I restrict the sample to municipalities
close to the border with a common cultural background to increase comparability of the localities
on both sides of the administrative border. The 2SLS estimates are highly signiﬁcant and very
similar to the OLS ones. To test the exclusion restriction I compare observable characteristics on
both sides of the administrative border, and run reduced form regressions in territories that have
experienced the same level of conscription, or no conscription at all. Municipalities on both sides
of the border have quasi-identical characteristics. Furthermore, there is no systematic diﬀerence
in voting behaviour in regions that experienced the same or no incorporation.
In the second part of this paper I try to disentangle the attitude reﬂected in this behaviour.
I ﬁrst make use of electoral manifesto data to ﬁgure out whether increased support is related to
the anti-establishment rhetoric of the radical right. The 2SLS estimates conﬁrm that there is
increased support not only for the radical right-wing candidates, but overall for candidates more
critical towards the political system. This result is robust to running within election and within
party OLS regressions.
I then turn to survey data to ﬁgure out the argument of the radical right-wing candidate's
programme that is most attractive for residents of municipalities where more men were con-
scripted. The radical right-wing programme in France traditionally consists of the following
topics: immigration, security, the defence of traditional values, the critique of political classes,
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the suppression of income taxes, and the exit from the EU. Only the critique of political classes
component of this discourse correlates with WWII exposure.
The question on the eﬀect of war exposure on political behaviour was ﬁrst asked by social
psychologists on the aftermath of WWII, and gained ground due to the widespread belief of
maladjustments to civic society amongst Vietnam War veterans3. During the last decade a liter-
ature has emerged in both economics and political sciences that tries to tackle the identiﬁcation
issue that comes from self-selection in the army by focusing on exogenous sources of exposure
to violence. The tragic experience of youth abduction in some African countries has allowed
such identiﬁcation. Blattman (2009) ﬁnds that violence witnessed, but not perpetrated, has a
positive impact on political participation in Uganda, while Bellows and Miguel (2009) present
evidence for an increase in the likelihood of participation in local political and community groups
of individuals that experienced more intense war violence in Sierra Leone4. While increased par-
ticipation is encouraging per se, the question on whether this results from increased support for
the polity (identiﬁcation) or from a will to revamp the system (alienation) remains unanswered.
Furthermore, since the political system in those countries is not developed, these studies fail to
provide evidence on the eﬀects of war exposure on actual voting behaviour.
A diﬀerent strand of literature has focused on the long-run persistence of values and beliefs
and intergenerational cultural transmission. Bisin and Verdier (2001) and Doepke and Zilibotti
(2008) have proposed models of preference transmission from parents to their oﬀspring. Voigtlän-
der and Voth (2012) show local continuity of anti-Semitic attitudes in Germany for over 600 years.
Fernández and Fogli (2009) and Algan and Cahuc (2010) use the epidemiological approach to
identify the long-run eﬀects of culture on work and fertility behaviour and growth respectively.
The main drawback of this literature is that while it has well documented the persistence of atti-
tudes and beliefs through a very long period, and the conditions under which they are reinforced,
it has provided no answer on the origin of these attitudinal diﬀerences.
This paper contributes to both these currents of literature in several ways. I establish a link
from war exposure to an aspect of political behaviour, voting, using actual electoral outcomes. I
do so in a developed country, France, using a major historical event, the Second World War. I
3See Stouﬀer et al. (1949) for the political behaviour of U.S. World War II veterans; Gillingham (1972);
Browne (1973); Lifton (1973); Levy (1974); Polner (1971) for Vietnam War veteran maladjustment; Fendrich and
Axelson (1971); Johnson (1976); Jenning and Markus (1977) for Vietnam War veteran political behaviour.
4Voors et al. (2012) and Gilligan et al. (2014) ﬁnd similar evidence using behavioural games in Burundi and
a lab-in-the ﬁeld experiment in Nepal.
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provide evidence that this diﬀerence in behaviour results from an attitude of political alienation.
Furthermore, I propose a novel source of exogenous war exposure, forcible conscription to the
Wehrmacht. Finally, I show that the shock in political preferences that occurred in the 1940s,
still persists today.
The structure of the paper is the following: Section 2 presents the historical context and data.
Section 3 presents the estimation strategy and results. In Section 4 I provide evidence on the
mechanism proposed and Section 5 concludes.
2 Historical background & data
2.1 Historical background
Shortly after the French capitulation on June 22, 1940, the Treaty of Frankfurt borders were
reinstated and Alsace and Moselle were annexed to the Third Reich5. The inhabitants of these
territories were considered of Germanic origin by the Reich authorities, they therefore became
liable to German military service following the example of Austria and other annexed regions6
(INSEE, 1956). The original policy of the German High Command was to voluntarily recruit
"racially Germanic" people, in order to keep the Wehrmacht nationally "pure". In 1941 however,
with the failure of the invasion of the Soviet Union, voluntary recruitment became compulsory
and the service of foreigners had to be brought under a more rigid supervision (USWD, 1945).
On August 25, 1942, after a one-year voluntary recruitment attempt had failed7, a decree
of the head of civil administration ordered the introduction of a mandatory military service for
"people of Germanic race in Alsace". The draft in Alsace followed the annual class system.
Conscription initially concerned the youth born from 1922 to 1924 but was soon extended to
all cohorts born from 1908 to 1927. In total, 20 cohorts of former French citizens from Alsace
were drafted to the Wehrmacht. An estimated 100,000 men, were incorporated in the German
military forces (MACVG, 1954).
5The Alsace region and the Moselle department were ceded to the German Empire with the Treaty of Frankfurt
in 1871 ending the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. They remained a part of the Empire until 1918 and the
end World War I.
6Territories with "Germanic" populations annexed by the Third Reich included Austria (1938), the Suden-
tenland in the former Czechoslovakia (1938), the Luxembourg (1942), and Wartheland, Upper Silesia, East and
West Prussia in Poland (1939).
7Voluntary recruitment for the Wehrmacht started on October 1941. According to G.R. Clément, by March
16, 1942, only 267 men from Alsace and Moselle had volunteered for the German military forces (Clément, 1945).
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The situation in Moselle diﬀered. The germanisation of the population was much lower, to
the point that the Westmark Gauleiter openly considered deporting the agricultural population
of the "French belt" to install German farmers8 (Latest News of Strasbourg, April 30, 1942).
Approximately 15% of the population was eventually deported, a stark contrast to the 3% de-
ported from Alsace (INSEE, 1956). The mandatory military service was nevertheless introduced
on August 1942 as well. While the 1914 to 1927 classes were drafted at the same time as the
Alsace youth, the 1908 to 1913 men were never drafted.
The lack of trust of the German military command towards former French citizens led to
several special arrangements concerning the incorporation of the latter. A decree on September
1942 ordained the deportation of defectors' families inside the Reich and the establishment of a
restricted area along the frontier with France and Switzerland to discourage evasion. The success
of the surveillance service of this area was such that, as explained in the local news, "to try to
illegally cross the border is a suicide attempt" (Latest News of Strasbourg, August 28, 1942). On
June 1943, the decision was taken that soldiers from Alsace and Moselle should be solely sent to
the Eastern Front, leaves should be restricted, and access at the transmission units and aviation
would be prohibited. Isolation from other former French citizens within units was also broadly
documented by returning soldiers.
The particularities of the conscription in Alsace and Moselle had a dual eﬀect. On one hand,
the fact that soldiers were exclusively sent on the Eastern Front and isolated within units led to
their scattering across the Eastern Front, resulting in an allocation process that was as good as
exogenous. On the other hand, severe repression of evasion and harsh punishment of defectors'
families led to very high compliance rates; nearly nine men out of ten served if eligible9.
The story of Camille oﬀers a good example on how incorporation took place10. Camille, a
tailor prior to the War, was born in Marmoutier, Alsace, in 1922. He was thus part of the ﬁrst
cohort drafted to the Wehrmacht and was incorporated on October 12, 1942. After passing the
8The "French belt" refers to the territories on the borders of Moselle with the rest of France. Inhabitants of
these region were not considered by German authorities to be "Germanic", their dialect being of French origin.
9Eligible men, based on the 1936 population census, were approximately 173,000 (INSEE, 1956). Of those,
14,000 were deported, mainly due to racial reasons (Romani, Jewish). 130,000 men were estimated incorporated.
4% of the men in the dataset used for the empirical analysis are born in years not drafted (always-takers). The
overall compliance rate would then be 78.6%. This is however a lower bound for compliance. Out of the 29,000
men not incorporated, only 13,000 are estimated to have ﬂed incorporation, while the remaining diﬀerence of
16,000 could be due to the estimation being based on the 1936 instead of the 1942 population. The upper bound
for compliance would therefore be 87.4%.
10I interviewed Camille in December 2014
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Review Board in Saverne, Alsace, he was sent to Innsbruck, Austria, for a brief training. On
November 29, 1942, he was sent to Murmansk, Russia, to get his main training. Even though he
could not ski prior to the War, Camille was chosen for the 139th Alpini Regiment. Furthermore,
as he recalled, the unit was solely composed of Austrians and Poles, with him being the only
soldier from France11. He was sent to the Kandalaktcha Front on March 12, 1944, where he
fought until he was wounded on February 8, 1945.
At the end of the War the re-founded French state initiated a large process of repatriation and
demobilization of soldiers from Alsace and Moselle. A ﬁrst special census to relocate men that
had not returned from the front took place in October 1945; 40,716 men were declared missing.
A second version of the same census came to light on April 1946; 55,013 men were now declared
missing12. Two-and-a-half years later, in November 1948, a second special census took place;
18,259 men were declared missing. By the time Jean-Jacques Remetter, the last soldier from
Alsace to return, crossed the Rhine in 1955, 100,000 men had returned from the front. Around
25,000 men fell on the battleﬁeld, while more than 5,000 never returned home, a big part of
whom presumably perished in captivity.
2.2 Incorporation data
Data on incorporation comes from the Index of French Nationals Compelled into German
Armed Forces. The Index resulted from an oﬃcial census organised by the Ministry of Veterans
and War Victims in October 1945. Its purpose was to repatriate prisoners of War held in allied
camps, whose French nationality could be recognised. This list, edited in French and translated
in 19 languages, was transmitted to all countries potentially holding Axis' prisoners of War in
November 1945 and April 1946.
There are several advantages in using the Index data. The census took place to liberate
potential prisoners of war and not for any kind of compensation, there was hence no incentive to
over- or under-report incorporation13. The fact that it contains municipality information on last
11A very similar story, that of Auguste Ritter, born in 1923 in Colmar, Haut-Rhin, can be found on
www.memoire-orale.org. As A. Ritter recalls, his unit was primarily composed of Austrians, only higher ranks
being German.
12The Ministry of Veterans and War victims explains in 1954 that, "While this number is higher than the
one of October 1945, this results from the fact that the (second version of the) census was unfortunately made a
little too hastily and a profound examination of the established lists could reveal that several men incorporated
declared missing, had either already returned, or were already diseased before this date" (MACVG, 1954).
13In March 1946 the ﬁrst oﬃcial post-War population census took place in France. A question on incorporation
was added for the three departments concerned. Yet, while at that moment an estimated 92,500 had returned
8
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Index Data
Alsace Moselle Total
Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Individual data (Binary)
Residence info 32483 1.000 12041 0.962 44524 0.989
Birth info 32483 0.997 12041 0.979 44524 0.992
Born year drafted 32469 0.968 11585 0.911 44054 0.953
Aggregate data
Declared missing (Binary) 904 0.991 730 0.807 1634 0.909
- of whom drafted 904 0.991 730 0.799 1634 0.905
- of whom not drafted 904 0.362 730 0.300 1634 0.334
Declared missing (Men) 904 35.9 730 15.9 1634 27.0
- of whom drafted 904 34.8 730 14.5 1634 25.7
- of whom not drafted 904 1.2 730 1.4 1634 1.3
Declared missing (%) 904 3.06 730 1.40 1634 2.32
(std.dev.) 1.29 1.27 1.52
Notes: Table 1 presents the raw Index data. Data comes from the Index of French Nationals Compelled into German
Armed Forces. The upper Panel presents the disaggregated (individual) data; the lower Panel presents the data after
collapsing at the municipality level. Residence info, Birth info, and Born year drafted are binary variables taking the value
1 when information is available. Born year drafted are men born in 1908-1927 for Alsace, and 1914-1927 for Moselle; only
individuals that have been matched to municipalities are included. Declared missing (Binary), Declared missing of whom
drafted (Binary), and Declared missing of whom not drafted (Binary) are variables that take the value 1 when there is at
least one individual in the municipality belonging to this group. Declared missing of whom not drafted (Binary) includes
individuals with birth information missing. Declared missing, Declared missing of whom drafted, and Declared missing of
whom not drafted is the number of individuals belonging to each category by municipality. Declared missing (%) is the
fraction of men declared missing over 1936 municipality population; standard deviation in parenthesis; both mean and
std.dev. are weighted by population to reﬂect aggregate, not average, statistics
known residence, allows for disaggregated estimations at diﬀerent levels of locality, keeping the
institutional and cultural background ﬁxed. Furthermore, men included in the Index were almost
exclusively sent on the Eastern Front, which allows to retrace military war exposure, cleared of
any potential violence witnessed or exposed to as a civilian.
The Index comprises 44,524 individuals. This indicates that in the beginning of 1946, approx-
imately one year after the War had ended, the fate of one-third of all men incorporated remained
unknown. The introduction of the Index contains a comprehensive list of municipalities in 1945,
both in French, and German. 44,054 men (98.9%) are matched to contemporary municipali-
ties, while 470 remain unmatched and have to be dropped. In Alsace, residence information is
missing for 7 men, while 4 localities, where 7 men come from, remain unmatched. The Moselle
list is unfortunately less precise; residence information is missing on 171 men, and 285 men are
from the front, only 65,500 men declared having been incorporated (INSEE, 1956). The arguments given by the
statistical oﬃce for this under-reporting are: migration into other regions, incorporation but no displacement,
and omission of incorporation.
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unmatched to contemporary municipalities14
Of the 44,054 individuals matched to contemporary municipalities, 41,966 were born in years
drafted to the Wehrmacht. 1,792 men were born in years that were not eligible for conscription,
1,475 of them being born before 1908 or 1914 (depending on the region), and 317 after 1927.
Birth date information is missing on 296 men.
After identifying the locality of residence, the data is aggregated at the municipality level
and normalized by the closest pre-War population census available, that of 1936. Out of 1,634
the municipalities existing in 2014, 1,485 (90.9%) have at least one man declared missing. As
shown in Table 1, on average, 2.32% of the 1936 population was declared missing (s.d. 1.52%).
The spatial distribution of men declared missing is presented in Figure 5 in the Appendix;
there was substantial variation both between the two regions and at a local level; neighbouring
municipalities had signiﬁcantly diﬀerent incorporation histories.
2.3 Measuring war exposure
The only available data on Wehrmacht conscription comes from the Index of French Nationals
Compelled into German Armed Forces15. The population of interest however is not men declared
missing, but those that actually returned from the front, once the conﬂict was over. I therefore
make use of the particularities of the conscription in Alsace and Moselle to infer from men
declared missing to men that actually returned from the front. The rationale and assumptions
allowing for this approximation are presented in this Section.
Men form municipality m that returned were men incorporated that survived the front, while
the overall dead were the sum of soldiers that perished in combat and those that died in allied
camps:
exposedm = incorporatedm − deadwar,m − deadcamp,m
or,
14There are for example, 58 men declared residing in Paris. Most of these men are not even born in Moselle; 15
out of these 58 men were born in Mulhouse, Alsace. Furthermore, the Moselle data contains several individuals
that have already been reported in the Alsace data, and were neither born, nor lived in Moselle prior to the War.
15Direct information on incorporation does not exist. The reason is two-fold: ﬁrstly, the decline of the German
administration and the overall destruction of archives that took place towards the end of the war; secondly, the





1− P (deadwar,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dead in War
−P (deadcamp,m)× P (prisonm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dead in camps
]× incorporatedm (1)
Men ﬁguring in the Index, were either imprisoned, or had perished before the end of the war,
but their relatives had not been informed:




P (prisonm)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Emprisoned
+(1− P (deadknown,m))× P (deadwar,m)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dead but thought missing
]× incorporatedm (2)








P (prisonm) + (1− P (deadknown,m))× P (deadwar,m)
][
1− P (deadwar,m)− P (deadcamp,m)× P (prisonm)
]
Men declared missing are therefore a good approximation of men exposed to WWII conﬂict
as far as θm is orthogonal to individual, and consequently municipality, characteristics.
Men incorporated were scattered across the Eastern front, and their individual characteristics
were not taken into account in this allocation. This should result in both the mortality and
imprisonment rate being independent of municipality of residence characteristics. Casualties
in camps can be assumed to be a constant fraction of prisoners of war; the camp imprisoned
depended on where caught. Assuming then that casualties were not systematically communicated
in some municipalities more than in others, the deaths not communicated should be a fraction
of the total number of casualties, and therefore
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θm ⊥ (εm|Xm)
Using aggregate data can give a rough approximation of θm. 130,000 men were incorporated
in Alsace and Moselle of whom 30,000 perished during the war or never came back and are
presumed dead. In 1946 approximately 44,000 men were declared missing. This implies that
the θm parameter would be on average equal to 0.44. This average θ is used to construct an
approximation of exposedm, by inﬂating missingm by 1/θ.
2.4 Capturing political alienation
As a ﬁrst approach, political alienation is approximated by electoral support for radical
right-wing candidates. Reducing extreme right-wing vote to its protest dimension yields the risk
of omitting the other ideological aspects of such electoral behaviour such as the authoritarian
values it advocates and its anti-universalism (Schwengler, 2003). The extreme right-wing has
nevertheless positioned itself as the ultimate anti-system party since the 1980s, referring to the
French political system as a corrupt system that only beneﬁts a closed circle of parties (Davies,
2002).
Ideological preferences are better captured in elections with high stakes. The intuition behind
focusing on such elections is that high stakes lead to polarization. There is a tendency not
to disperse votes and true preferences are more likely to be revealed, making localities with
more radical views easier to detect (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012). Furthermore, focussing on
a decision-making process with only two alternatives has been shown to be robust to strategic
voting (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). The 2002 Presidential Election second round oﬀers such a
context.
In the 2002 Presidential Election there were two clear ﬁrst round favourites; Jacques Chirac,
the incumbent President, and Lionel Jospin, the holding Prime Minister. A presidential election-
record of 16 candidates participated. The extreme right-wing was represented by its leader,
Jean-Marie Le Pen, that had been presenting himself in every presidential election since 197416.
One of the main arguments of Le Pen's political statement was that "Corruption reigns at the
head of the Republic" and that voters should discard discredited politicians.
The certainty of the public opinion concerning the candidates to face-oﬀ in the second round17
16With the exception of 1981, where there was no ERW candidate.
17The 12 polls published preceding the ﬁrst-round election gave an average diﬀerence of 5.3 points between
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led to a great dispersion of votes, which in turn led Le Pen to a surprise second seat, ahead of
Jospin. Le Pen ranked ﬁrst in both Alsace and Moselle. In the two weeks between the two election
rounds, the so-called "Republican disclaimer" took place: all eliminated candidates urged electors
to vote for Chirac, Jospin himself calling his electors to bar the way to the extreme right (Cole,
2002).
In the second round participation jumped by 8.5 percentage points to 80.1%. The result
was quasi-unanimous: Le Pen's vote share retreated by 1.3% to 17.85% of votes18, while Chirac
increased his from 19.9% to 82.15%. Out of 19,680,091 votes available in the second round, Le
Pen only received 29,884 additional ballots19.
There was nevertheless substantial variation both overall, and at the local level. The villages
of Zarbeling and Destry in Moselle oﬀer a good example of this variation. In the second round of
the 2002 presidential election Le Pen received 4.4% of votes in Zarbeling, one of his lowest scores
in the two regions; his highest score was in Destry (46%), the latter being only 11.8 kilometres
away from the former.
3 Estimation strategy & results
3.1 Baseline speciﬁcation
To evaluate the impact of exposure to violence on political behaviour, I use data on the
incorporation of former French citizens to the Wehrmacht during WWII and contemporary vote,
while taking into account several pre-War and contemporary socio-economic characteristics. The
eﬀect is at ﬁrst estimated by OLS using the following speciﬁcation:




mγ + ζd + εm (4)
votesharem represents the score of the radical right-wing candidate in municipalitym. exposedm
are men that returned home after being exposed to WWII violence as a fraction of the 1936 pop-
ulation. Xm and Zm are column vectors of the pre-War and contemporary characteristics. ζd
Jospin (second) and Le Pen (third), and no poll gave a diﬀerence smaller than 4 percentage points between the
two candidates (Durand et al., 2004).
18From a combined 19.2% with Bruno Mégret, his former number two in the National Front, in the ﬁrst round.
19In the second round there were 30,818,961 valid votes; Le Pen received 5,502,314 of them. In the ﬁrst round
Chirac received 5,666,440 votes; Le Pen 4,805,307; Mégret 667,123.
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are district20 (or sub-district in some speciﬁcations) and dialect origin ﬁxed eﬀects21, to ensure
comparing municipalities that are close-by both spatially and culturally. All fraction variables
are transformed in natural logarithms to facilitate the interpretation of coeﬃcients. Since many
of the pre-War characteristics only vary at the sub-district level, standard errors are clustered at
this level to correct for potential serial correlation.
The historical covariates vectorXm is included to ensure comparability between municipalities
before the War. It consists of geographical endowments, sociocultural aspects and electoral
outcomes. The geographical endowments are intended to approximate soil rigidity that might
be aﬀecting agricultural output and techniques used, historical trade openness, and the distance
to Germany and the rest of France. The sociocultural aspects are religious aﬃliation, languages
spoken, and educational attainment22. The 1936 election was the last election prior to the War.
Its outcomes are introduced to capture pre-War political views. The descriptives of pre-War
characteristics are presented in Table 9 in the Appendix.
The vector of contemporary control variables Zm is intended to pick up short- and medium-
term municipality characteristics that might aﬀect voting behaviour. It includes demographic
characteristics, and socioeconomic aspects. The demographic characteristics are included to
grasp urbanization, the demographic pyramid, immigration, and whether a municipality is iso-
lated. The socioeconomic controls are composed by the sectoral employment distribution and
labour market conditions, educational attainment, and wealth. The descriptives of contemporary
covariates are presented in Table 10 in the Appendix.
3.2 Baseline results
Table 2 presents the OLS estimates from the regression of Equation (4) for the second round of
the 2002 Presidential election. Column (1) reports the estimates of the eﬀect of WWII exposure
on contemporary political radicalization when only including district and dialect origin ﬁxed
eﬀects. The eﬀect is positive and highly signiﬁcant.
20Districts (Arrondissements) and Sub-districts (Cantons) are the third- and second-lowest administrative
units in France respectively, municipalities being the ﬁrst. A 1936 district consists of 78 municipalities on average
(min=30, max=143); a 1936 sub-district of 18 (min=5, max=36). In 1936 there were 21 districts and 89 sub-
districts in the annexed regions.
21Localities in the south of Moselle historically spoke a dialect of French origin, while the north of Moselle and
the Alsace dialects are of Germanic origin. This linguistic frontier that dates back to the 5th century C.E. (Lévy,
1929), was still very present in the 1930s.
22German was the oﬃcial language in Alsace and Moselle from 1871 to 1918. French was the oﬃcial language
after WWI. I assume that people that speak no oﬃcial language have little or no education.
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Table 2: Baseline Specification: OLS Estimates for 2002R2 Election
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Vote Share (%)
Exposed (%) 0.281*** 0.178*** 0.167** 0.174**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.069) (0.067)
Sociocultural aspects (1936) Yes
Ideological preferences (1936) Yes
Geographical endowments Yes Yes Yes
Demographic charact. (Contemp.) Yes Yes Yes
Socioeconomic aspects (Contemp.) Yes Yes Yes
District F.E. (1936) Yes Yes Yes
Sub-district F.E. (1936) Yes
Dialect origin F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1634 1634 1634 1634
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.24 0.29 0.26
Variance explained 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.10
Notes: OLS estimates of the eﬀect of Second World War exposure on support for the radical right wing in the 2002
presidential election second round. Sample includes all municipalities from Alsace and Moselle. All regressions run at
the municipality level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the sub-district level. Variance explained is the
estimate resulting from a regression analysis that has been standardized so that the variances of dependent and independent
variables are 1. All regressions include the full set of controls of Equation (4). All variables constructed as described in
Tables 9 and 10 in the Appendix. District (1936), Sub-district (1936), and Dialect origin F.E. presented in Figures 6, 7,
and 8 in the Appendix. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
In Column (2), the contemporary covariates vector Zm is introduced to control for the fact
that incorporation might have aﬀected other contemporary outcomes that in turn aﬀect voting.
Even after controlling for these diﬀerences the eﬀect remains positive and highly signiﬁcant. A
within district 1 percentage point increase in men exposed to war leads to a 0.18 percentage
points increase in extreme right-wing votes in 2002.
In Column (3), the same regression is run as in Column (2), only this time including sub-
district, instead of district, ﬁxed eﬀects. This speciﬁcation is particularly demanding since it
requires the estimation of 103 ﬁxed eﬀects. Furthermore, while the average distance between
two municipalities in the same district is 17 kilometres, in the same sub-district it is only 7
kilometres. The point estimate remains nevertheless quasi-identical to the one in Column (2).
Finally, in Column (4), the historical covariates vector Xm is included. By doing so, I can
control for the fact that pre-War diﬀerences might be driving both incorporation and voting
behaviour. Since most pre-War characteristics are only available at the sub-district level, district
ﬁxed eﬀects are introduced. Results remain robust, positive and highly signiﬁcant23. The radical
23This suggests that there is little heterogeneity in pre-War characteristics when reﬁning estimations at this
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right wing vote share in the second round of the 2002 Presidential Election is on average 0.17
percentage points higher in municipalities that had 1 percentage point more men returning form
WWII. A 1 standard deviation increase in war exposure (3.2 p.p.) increases support for radical
right-wing candidates by 0.10 std.dev. (0.5 p.p.).
Are these eﬀects of considerable magnitude? Results from Column (4) imply that incorpo-
ration can explain up to 10% of the variability in radical-right wing voting in 2002. Performing
a counter-factual exercise can help understanding the magnitude of this eﬀect. Should these
regions not experience this incorporation history, the predicted Le Pen vote share in 2002 would
drop by 1%, reducing the diﬀerence between these regions (21%) and the National average (18%)
by one-third.
3.3 Threats to identiﬁcation
The intuition behind results shown in Table 2 is that the variation in the age distribution
in the 1930s led to some municipalities having more men eligible than others. This, in turn,
resulted in diﬀerent incorporation histories, which had a diﬀerential eﬀect on post-War political
behaviour. These OLS estimates however are only valid as long as the error term is orthogonal
to the explanatory variables. Understanding the sources of variation in men that returned from
the front can therefore help detect potential endogeneity issues.
The particularities of the draft to the Wehrmacht led to an allocation in units and fronts that
was as good as exogenous, as argued in Section 2.3. The men that returned from the front can
be considered to be the following fraction of all men incorporated:
exposedm =
[




Since mortality and imprisonment rates are independent of municipality characteristics, variation
should come from men overall incorporated. Men overall incorporated are in turn deﬁned by the
compliance rate (P (incorp | yob = draft)), and the eligibility rate (P (yob = draft)):
incorporatedm = P (incorp | yob = draft)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Compliance variation︸ ︷︷ ︸
Persistence component
× P (yob = draft)︸ ︷︷ ︸





So far I have assumed that the relationship described in Equation (6) is driven by the el-
igibility rate, and that variation in demography is exogenous to political behaviour. In other
words, I have assumed that compliance stays constant because of the forcible conscription, and
that demographic diﬀerences leading to diﬀerences in eligibility, are unrelated to contemporary
political views. Exposure endogeneity could therefore stem from these two sources.
Compliance variation could result from pre-War diﬀerences not captured by the historical
covariates vector. Should a latent sentiment that determines compliance persist and be correlated
with contemporary voting attitudes, the OLS estimates would suﬀer from an omitted variable
bias. If for example conscription monitoring was more severe in municipalities with a stronger
attachment to France, and these same municipalities are more nationalistic today, the estimates
would be upward biased.
Demography variation could reﬂect long-run cultural traits. Fertility has been shown to
be endogenous to culture (Fernandez et al., 2004). If fertility was historically higher in more
conservative municipalities and these places vote more in favour of radical right-wing candidates
nowadays, this would once again result in an upward bias of the OLS estimates.
3.4 Instrumental variables approach
To correct for these potential biases, I take advantage of the diﬀerence between the admin-
istrative rules dictating incorporation in Alsace and Moselle. While cohorts 1908 to 1927 were
drafted in Alsace, only cohorts 1914 to 1927 were incorporated in Moselle. This should result in
more men being incorporated in the Alsace than in Moselle:
P (yob = draft | reg = Alsace)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Alsace: born 1908-1927
> P (yob = draft | reg = Moselle)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Moselle: born 1914-1927
(7)
The diﬀerence in the incorporation rule is presented in Figure 2. There is a clear jump in the
number of men declared missing in years eligible for the draft, resulting in almost no men born in
years 1908 to 1914 drafted in Moselle. Taking advantage of the discontinuity in the conscription
rule can thus allow establishing a causal link between war exposure and contemporary extreme-
right wing voting by applying an instrumental variable strategy.
The necessary conditions for an instrumental variables approach to be valid are the instrument
relevance and exogeneity. The administrative rule should be relevant to the fraction of men
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Figure 2: Index Data: Men Declared Missing YoB Distribution
Note: Graph of the year of birth distribution of men declared missing. Data comes from the Index of French Nationals
Compelled into German Armed Forces. Declared missing is the total number of men born in each cohort and listed in the
Index. Only men matched to contemporary municipalities are included. Oldest and Youngest refer to the cohorts drafted.
The dashed lines represent the incorporation rules.
returning from War since, due to the particularities of the conscription, compliance rates were
very high. The administrative rule should at the same time be exogenous to contemporary voting
behaviour, meaning that it should be correlated to electoral outcomes only through conscription
to the Wehrmacht.
As already explained in Section 2.1, the diﬀerence in the administrative rule comes from
a diﬀerence in the overall level of "germanization" of the two regions. The instrument might
therefore not be exogenous when taking into account the entire regions; it can however be
considered as good as exogenous when considering municipalities close to the administrative
border. Furthermore, restricting geographical and cultural proximity can help deal with this
issue, since comparing municipalities that are neighbouring has been shown to resolve omitted
variable biases (Card and Krueger, 1995)24.
The identifying assumption is therefore that the diﬀerence in men exposed to WWII between
municipalities close, but on diﬀerent sides of the administrative border, comes from the diﬀer-
24An important assumption on the instrument exogeneity is the exogenous construction of the administrative
border. Departments in France were created after the Revolution, in 1790. The department borders where altered
in 1918 to account for the 1871-1918 German annexation; Moselle was expanded to the south, the Bas-Rhin
expanded in the south-west (a part of the Vosges department), and the Haut-Rhin lost the Belfort territory.
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Figure 3: Instrumental Variables: Discontinuity Sub-Samples
Note: Map of the discontinuity sub-samples in the Alsace and Moselle regions. Less than 10km, 10 - 20km, and More
than 20km indicate the distance to the discontinuity. Distance from the discontinuity measured as bird-ﬂy distance to the
location of the closest municipality on the other side of the border. Rhine Franconian indicates municipalities that share
the same dialect origin. 15km × 15km Grid FE resulting from the above grid presented in Figure 9 in the Appendix.
Municipality limits valid as of Jan 1, 2014.
ent conscription rule (conditional on covariates), and that unobservable characteristics of these
municipalities do not diﬀer.
To implement the instrumental variables approach I run the following 2-Stage Least Squares
estimation:
votesharem = α+ δ2SLS ̂exposedm +X ′mβ + Z ′mγ + ζg + εm (8)
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where ̂exposedm is estimated from the First-Stage regression:
̂exposedm = α+ δFSalsacem +X ′mβ + Z ′mγ + ζg (9)
̂exposedm is the predicted fraction of men returning from the front. Since districts and sub-
districts do not vary with the exogenous instrument, to preserve geographical locality, 15km Grid
ﬁxed eﬀects (ζg) are included, constructed as shown in Figure 3
25. Furthermore, 20km and 10km
distance from the discontinuity border and common cultural inheritance sample restrictions are
applied.
alsacem is the exogenous instrument, an indicator taking the value 1 when municipality m in
grid g is in Alsace. The coeﬃcient δFS therefore captures the average diﬀerence in men returned
from war between municipalities from Alsace and Moselle within a 15km grid.
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 I have shown that when reﬁning to small levels of locality
pre-War characteristics do not ﬂuctuate much. To prevent creating artiﬁcial discontinuities
from the fact that pre-War electoral and socio-cultural characteristics data are only available
at the sub-district level, I exclude these covariates form both stages26. The estimation of the
instrumental variables approach is therefore the 2SLS equivalent of the OLS regression in Column
(3) of Table 2.
3.5 2-Stage Least Squares estimates
Table 3 presents the results from the two-stage least squares estimation. Panel A reproduces
the OLS estimates of Column (3) of Table 2, using grid instead of sub-district ﬁxed eﬀects. Panel
B presents the First-Stage 2SLS estimates of Equation (9). Panel C presents the Reduced-Form
estimates from regressing extreme right-wing votes on the Alsace indicator. Panel D presents
the Second-Stage 2SLS estimates, hence the estimated coeﬃcients of Equation (8).
In Column (1) I use the full sample. The OLS estimate is identical to the estimate using
25The arbitrary choice of 15×15 km grid is made to approximate the average size of sub-district F.E. that is
of 150 squared kilometres.
26This creates an additional threat to the 2SLS identiﬁcation: pre-War comparability. Part of this threat is
corrected by including the dialect FE; only neighbouring municipalities with the same dialect are compared. The
main remaining threat is therefore religion (protestant vs catholic). As shown in (Schwengler, 2003), municipalities
where there are more protestants appear to vote less in favour of radical right-wing candidates. Taking into
account that municipalities in Alsace have globally more protestants, this would bias downwards the reduced
form estimates and therefore the 2SLS estimates as well.
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sub-district ﬁxed eﬀects (Table 2). Municipalities in Alsace have on average 3 percentage points
more men returning from War than those in Moselle. The First-Stage F-statistic of 29 largely
surpasses the rule of thumb F-stat of 10 that is usually required to have a valid First-Stage.
2SLS estimators indicate that a 1 percent increase in men exposed to WWII violence causes an
increase of radical-right wing votes by 0.47 percentage points.
There is reasonable doubt however in assuming the conscription rule change is exogenous
when considering the entire regions. Should this not be the case, it would render the estimation
strategy invalid. Column (2) addresses this issue by restricting the sample to municipalities
within 20 kilometres from the closest municipality on the other side of the administrative border.
This reduces average distance from the frontier from 44km to just 11km. The First-Stage remains
valid (F-stat=18 ). The eﬀect is of similar magnitude and the potential bias in the OLS estimate
is relatively smaller.
In Column (3) I introduce dialect ﬁxed eﬀects to reinforce cultural proximity; places that
have the same language origin are typically not separated by any large natural obstacles, such
as mountains27. Furthermore, since these dialects date back to the 5th century C.E., these ﬁxed
eﬀects result in comparing municipalities that share a very long common history (Lévy, 1929).
The 2SLS estimate after controlling for these dialects is very similar to that of Columns (1) and
(2).
In Column (4) the sample is further restricted to municipalities no more than 10km from
the border. This results in comparing municipalities that are on average 6km apart. Results
indicate that a 1 percent increase in men returning from the front leads to a 0.51 percentage
point increase in radical support in the second round of the 2002 Presidential Election. The
eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant and the point estimate is identical to the OLS estimate. Results imply
that a 1 standard deviation increase in war exposure in these municipalities (3%) can explain up
to 0.31 standard deviations (4.7%) of political radicalization.
A counter-factual exercise indicates that in the absence of WWII experience, extreme right-
wing voting in municipalities within 10km from the Alsace-Moselle border (Column (4)), would
drop from 26% to 22.5%. Transposing this eﬀect to the rest of the region, results in a reduction
of radical-right wing votes by 2.9 percentage points, which is very close to the diﬀerence from
the national average.
27Only few dialects are spoken on both sides of the border; Rhine Franconian is the most popular.
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Table 3: Instrumental Variables: 2SLS Estimates for 2002R2 Election
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Proximity measure Geographical Geographical Cultural & Cultural &
Geographical Geographical
Panel A: OLS estimates. Dependent variable: Vote Share (%)
Exposed (%) 0.167*** 0.262** 0.262** 0.525***
(0.063) (0.124) (0.125) (0.182)
Panel B: First-stage 2SLS estimates. Dependent variable: Exposed (%)
Alsace dummy 3.024*** 2.817*** 2.825*** 2.739***
(0.557) (0.664) (0.661) (0.622)
First-stage F-statistic 29.49 18.00 18.25 19.42
Panel C: Reduced-form 2SLS estimates. Dependent variable: Vote Share (%)
Alsace dummy 1.416** 1.414** 1.340** 1.403*
(0.610) (0.618) (0.608) (0.715)
Panel D: Second-stage 2SLS estimates. Dependent variable: Exposed (%)
Exposed (%) 0.468** 0.502** 0.474** 0.512**
(0.191) (0.217) (0.205) (0.210)
Geographical endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. cov. vector Yes Yes Yes Yes
15km Grid F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dialect origin F.E. Yes Yes
Dialect F.E. Yes Yes
Sample restrictions None 20km 20km 10km
Observations 1634 482 482 212
Mean distance from Frontier 44.1 11.1 11.1 5.7
2SLS/OLS coeﬃcient ratio 2.80 1.91 1.81 0.98
Variance explained 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.31
Notes: 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of Second World War exposure on support for the radical right wing in the 2002
presidential election second round. Panel A: OLS estimates (Equation (4)). Panel B: First-stage 2SLS estimates (Equation
(9)). Alsace dummy is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when a municipality is in Alsace and 0 otherwise. Panel
C: Reduced-form estimates from regressing support for the radical right wing candidates on the Alsace dummy variable.
Panel D: Second-stage 2SLS estimates (Equation (8)). All regressions run at the municipality level. Robust standard
errors in parentheses, clustered at the sub-district (canton) level. Column (1) includes all municipalities from Alsace and
Moselle; Columns (2) & (3) within 20km; Column (4) within 10km. Discontinuity sub-samples constructed as described
in Figure 3. Mean distance from Frontier is the average distance from the closest municipality on the other side of the
border. First-stage F-statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic of the First-stage regression presented in Panel
B. 2SLS/OLS coeﬃcient ratio is the ratio of the coeﬃcients presented in Panel D and Panel A. Variance explained is the
estimate resulting from a regression analysis that has been standardized so that the variances of dependent and independent
variables are 1. All regressions include the full set of controls of Equation (4), with the exception of Pre-War covariates
vector. All variables constructed as described in Tables 9 and 10. Dialect origin, 15km Grid, and Dialect F.E. presented in
Figures 8, 9, and 10 in the Appendix. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
3.6 Robustness checks
To evaluate whether results are driven by the arbitrarily chosen distances from the border, I
apply the instrument variables approach on all potential samples ranging from less than 20km
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables: Reduced-form falsifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Vote Share (%)
Discontinuity Bas-Rhin Bas-Rhin Meurthe-et-M. Meurthe-et-M.
& Moselle & Haut-Rhin & Meuse & Vosges
Bas-Rhin dummy 1.403* 1.477
(0.715) (1.795)
Meurthe-et-Moselle dummy 1.919 2.494
(1.456) (1.896)
Geographical endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. cov. vector Yes Yes Yes Yes
15km Grid F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dialect origin F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dialect F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 212 149 232 236
Mean dist. from Frontier 5.7 11.3 5.9 5.7
Notes: Reduced-form estimates of the eﬀect of Second World War exposure on support for the radical right wing in the 2002
presidential election second round. All regressions run at the municipality level. Robust standard errors in parentheses,
clustered at the sub-district (canton) level. Column (1) includes municipalities from the Bas-Rhin and Moselle within
10km from the departments' common border; Column (2) from the Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin within 20km (larger border
because data limitations when restricting to 10km (63 observation); results hold nevertheless when restricting to 10km
(p − value = 0.324)); Column (3) from the Meurthe-et-Moselle and Meuse within 10km; Column (4) from the Meurthe-
et-Moselle and Vosges within 10km. Discontinuity sub-samples constructed as described in Figure 6. Department limits
presented in Figure 6. Mean distance from Frontier is the average distance from the closest municipality on the other side
of the border. All regressions include the full set of controls presented in Table 3. All variables constructed as described
in Tables 9 and 10. Dialect origin, 15km Grid, and Dialect F.E. presented in Figures 8, 9, and 10 in the Appendix. *
signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
to the border up to 10km from the border. The results from running these 2SLS regressions are
depicted in Figure 11 in the Appendix instead of a table for simplicity. For all potential samples
the estimated coeﬃcient ranges from 0.45 to 0.5. All coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant.
Results shown in Table 3 are therefore not driven by the arbitrary choice of a 20 and 10km
threshold, but hold for several other proximity levels.
Reduced form estimates from Table 3 indicate that the radical candidate received a higher
share of votes in Alsace municipalities within 10km from the Alsace-Moselle border. This is
consistent with the fact that more men were exposed to WWII in Alsace and that war exposure
has an eﬀect on voting behaviour. If the exclusion restriction holds, being in Alsace should only
have an eﬀect on support for radical candidates through war exposure; there should be no eﬀect
on votes from administrative borders when there is no variation in war exposure.
To assess the validity of the exclusion restriction I perform falsiﬁcation tests on other depart-
ments' borders that have experienced the same level or no incorporation. Results are presented
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in Table 4. In Column (1) I replicate the reduced form regression using the sub-sample of mu-
nicipalities within 10km from the Bas-Rhin-Moselle border28 (Table 3, Column (3), Panel D).
Localities in the Bas-Rhin vote on average 1.4 percent more in favour of radical candidates than
their Moselle counterparts.
In Column (2) I run the same regression, this time using the two departments in Alsace.
Men born from 1908 to 1927 in both the Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin were incorporated in the
Wehrmacht. If department limits only aﬀect voting through war exposure, there should be no
diﬀerence in the way neighbouring municipalities vote in these departments. This is indeed the
case; there is no systematic diﬀerence in radical support within 20km of the Bas- and Haut-Rhin
border29.
Columns (3) and (4) present the results from the same reduced form regression for the other 3
departments of the Lorraine region: Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, and Vosges. Since none of these
departments has experienced the incorporation history Alsace and Moselle have, there should be
no systematic diﬀerence in support on either side of the frontier. Results in Table 4 are in line
with this prediction. Bordering municipalities in the Meuthe-et-Moselle department do not vote
diﬀerently than their Meuse or Vosges neighbours.
A last threat to identiﬁcation that needs to be addressed is comparability of municipalities
on both sides of the border. Table 11 in the Appendix presents the diﬀerence-in-means of the
observable municipality characteristics for the four samples presented in Table 3. Municipalities
in Alsace and Moselle only signiﬁcantly diﬀer with respect to some geographical endowments
(longitude and elevation std.dev.), and population density. Reassuringly, these characteristics
do not correlate with incorporation, as shown in Table 10 in the Appendix.
28In the Alsace region, only municipalities from the Bas-Rhin are within 10km from the Alsace-Moselle border,
as shown in Figure 3 in the appendix. This results in the Bas-Rhin dummy being collinear to the Alsace dummy
when restricting to municipalities within 10km of the border.
29The Bas-Rhin and Haut-Rhin discontinuity border is larger because of data limitations when restricting to




Findings in Section 3 establish a causal link between WWII participation and support for
radical candidates 70 years after the end of the conﬂict. While these ﬁndings present the be-
havioural consequences of being actively exposed to war, they fail to explain the attitudes driving
this relationship. This section tests whether the support for radical candidates presented in the
previous section is resulting from a lack of support for the system or regime, also known as
political alienation.
The theoretical framework behind the proposed mechanism draws from research in social
psychology. Upon returning from the front these veterans had to reintegrate the re-founded
French state. The lack of understanding of the reasons they had to ﬁght this abominable war,
and the feeling of being let down by the French state, led to a distrust of the established political
authorities. This distrust was transmitted to the following generations, through both oblique
and vertical transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2001).
As long as there was no political discourse able to capture this hostility towards the policy,
this attitude was hardly reﬂected in electoral outcomes. With the emergence however of the
radical right-wing and its anti-establishment discourse, this political alienation was transformed
into increased support for these candidates.
4.2 Manifesto data evidence
A ﬁrst approach to testing the proposed mechanism is to investigate electoral campaign
manifestos. The Manifesto Project Dataset contains information on the share of quasi-sentences
spent by major parties on several topics, ranging from external relations to the political system
and welfare and life quality. Manifestos have been coded for legislative elections since 1946 and
European parliament elections since 1979, in several European countries. The political system
section includes 5 variables: decentralization, centralization, governmental and administrative
eﬃciency, political corruption, and political authority. I focus on political corruption, which
counts the number of cases where a candidate has referred to the "need to eliminate political
corruption and associated abuses of political and/or bureaucratic power".
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Table 5: Proposed Mechanism: 2SLS Estimates for Political Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Vote Share (%): Discource on political corruption> median
Proximity measure Geographical Geographical Cultural & Cultural &
Geographical Geographical
1965 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 1.435*** 1.341*** 1.330*** 1.116***
(0.405) (0.415) (0.410) (0.285)
1995 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 0.580 0.491 0.466 0.439
(0.405) (0.419) (0.399) (0.312)
2002 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 1.365*** 1.516*** 1.534*** 1.627***
(0.221) (0.313) (0.309) (0.248)
2007 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 0.468** 0.478** 0.474** 0.164
(0.230) (0.215) (0.213) (0.294)
2012 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 1.121*** 1.278*** 1.305*** 1.250***
(0.245) (0.268) (0.284) (0.246)
Geographical endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. cov. vector Yes Yes Yes Yes
15km Grid F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dialect origin F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dialect F.E. Yes Yes
Sample restrictions None 20km 20km 10km
Observations 1634 482 482 212
Notes: 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of Second World War exposure on support for candidates with above the median
mentions of political corruption in the 1965 to 2012 Presidential Election ﬁrst rounds. Each coeﬃcient is the 2SLS estimate
of a separate regression. The dependent variable is the sum of votes for candidates with above the median mentions of
political corruption in their manifesto. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the sub-district level. Column (1)
includes all municipalities from Alsace and Moselle; Columns (2) & (3) within 20km; Column (4) within 10km. Discontinuity
sub-samples constructed as described in Figure 6. All regressions include the full set of controls of Equation (4). with the
exception of Pre-War covariates vector. All variables constructed as described in Tables 9 and 10. Dialect origin, 15km
Grid, and Dialect F.E. presented in Figures 8, 9, and 10 in the Appendix. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
Each variable in the Manifesto Project Dataset is constructed as a share of the program
spent on the speciﬁc topic. A ﬁrst approach is to separate candidates into those with above and
below the median mentions of corruption, and run the 2SLS estimation presented in Section 3.
Since there are only two candidates in the second round of the 2002 Presidential Election, the
estimated coeﬃcients for this election would be identical to the coeﬃcients presented in Table
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3. I thus turn to the ﬁrst round of Presidential Elections in 1965 and 1995-201230. While ﬁrst
round ballots are more prone to strategic voting, this should primarily be an issue post-2002, as
explained in Section 2.4.
The strategy I use is the following: I ﬁrst identify, by presidential election, which candidates
refer more to political corruption. I then sum up the number of votes acquired these candidates.
This strategy therefore takes into account variation in support across candidates in a particular
election.
Results from running the 2SLS estimation are presented in Table 5. Each coeﬃcient is
resulting from a diﬀerent regression. War exposure has a positive, and statistically signiﬁcant
in most cases, eﬀect on support for candidates that refer most to political corruption in their
discourse for all elections presented in Table 5. Furthermore, this eﬀect is strongest in 1965, a
ﬁnding that is consistent with an intergenerational transmission mechanism.
A second strategy used to identify the eﬀect of war exposure on political identiﬁcation is to
take advantage of the variation between and within parties31. Political discourse evolves with
time, allowing therefore to identify the eﬀect of a party not mentioning political corruption in
its manifesto any more.
Table 6 presents results from within election and within party regressions. Column (1)
presents the within election eﬀect of war exposure on support for candidates with an anti-
establishment program. Anti-establishment candidates receive on average 2.3 percent of votes
less than candidates that do not mention corruption. A 1 percentage point increase in war expo-
sure however, is associated to a 0.14 percentage point increase in support for anti-establishment
candidates. The coeﬃcient on war exposure is not without signiﬁcance either; since all candi-
dates are included in these regressions, it simply captures the average number of valid, non-blank
ballots in the municipality. This implies that a 1 percent increase in war exposure is associated
with a 0.07 percentage point increase in blank ballots32.
Column (2) of Table 6 presents the results within party. It therefore captures variation in
the program of a single party through time. Results are quasi-identical to those in Column (1).
30The choice of elections is data driven. Radical candidates were present at the 1974 and 1988 elections as
well. Data for these elections however is only available upon special request. I plan to include these elections in
my analysis in the future.
31I use parties instead of candidates, since candidates representing a party change in most elections.
32Since electoral outcomes are transformed in natural logarithms this coeﬃcient could also be capturing political
fractionalization, meaning it could partially result from increased support for minor candidates.
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Table 6: Proposed Mechanism: Pooled OLS Estimates for Political Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Vote Share (%)
Corruptionc>med 3.378*** 7.320*** 5.232*** 3.044***





Exposed (%) 0.070*** 0.093*** 0.070*** 0.126***
(0.015) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010)
×Corruptionc>med 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.121***







Election × Nuance F.E. Yes Yes
Pre-War covariates vector Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographical endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. cov. vector Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-district F.E. (1936) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dialect origin F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 89870 89870 89870 89870
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.51 0.56 0.63
Notes: OLS estimates of the eﬀect of Second World War exposure on support for candidates with above the median
mentions of political corruption in the 1965 to 2012 Presidential Election ﬁrst rounds. Pooled regressions. The dependent
variable is the vote share for each candidate. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the municipality × election
level. Column (1) includes election year ﬁxed eﬀects; Column (2) party ﬁxed eﬀects; Columns (3) and (4) election year
× nuance ﬁxed eﬀects; Parties are: CPNT (Saint-Josse (2002), Nihous (2007)), FN (Le Pen JM (1995-2007), Le Pen M
(2012)), LCR (Besancenot (2002, 2007), Poutou (2012)), LO (Laguiller (2002-2007), Gluckstein (2002), Arthaud (2012)),
MDC (Chevènement (2002)), MPF (de Villiers (1995, 2007), Cheminade (1995)), PCF (Hue (1995, 2002), Laguiller (1995),
Buﬀet (2007), Mélenchon (2012)), PRG (Barbu (1965), Taubira (2002)), PS (Mitterrand (1965), Jospin (1995, 2002), Royal
(2007), Hollande (2012)), PdT (Schivardi (2007)), RPR (de Gaulle (1965), Chirac (1995, 2002), Boutin (2002), Sarkozy
(2007, 2012), Dupont-Aignan (2012)), SP (Cheminade (2012)), UDCA (Tixier-Vignancour (1965)), UDF (Lecanuet (1965),
Balladur (1995), Bayrou (2002-2012)), UDI (Marcilhacy (1965), Lepage (2002), Madelin (2002)), VEC (Voynet (1995, 2007),
Mamère (2002), Bové (2007), Joly (2012)). Nuances are: DVD (CPNT, MPF, SP, UDF, UDI), DVG (MDC, PRG), EXD
(FN, UDCA), EXG (LCR, LO, PdT), PCF, PS, RPR, VEC. All regressions include the full set of controls of Equation (4).
All variables constructed as described in Tables 9 and 10. Sub-district (1936), and Dialect origin F.E. presented in Figures
7, and 8 in the Appendix. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
Column (3) presents the same regression including election times nuance ﬁxed eﬀects. Variation
therefore comes solely from parties that are ideologically close, in the same election. Results are
almost identical. The only diﬀerence comes from the fact that within nuance, parties that talk
more about political corruption actually receive higher vote shares, as captured by the coeﬃcient
on the Corruptionc>med dummy variable.
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Finally in Column (4) I test whether I am actually capturing some other aspect of the dis-
course of radical right-wing parties, such as a taste for authority, or its anti-universalism. I
therefore use positive mentions of the military, and traditional morality and separate candidates
above/below the median in the exact same way as with political corruption. Results could
therefore be either interpreted as ones controlling for these discourse aspects, or as a horse-race
regression. Results are robust to the inclusion of these binary variables and their interaction
term with war exposure. The interaction of both mentions of the military and traditional moral-
ity with war exposure are positive as well, but of smaller magnitude than the one with political
corruption. The eﬀect of war exposure on support for candidates that have an anti-establishment
discourse does not appear to be driven by a taste for authority or an in-group bias.
4.3 Survey data evidence
I then turn to electoral survey data. The 2002 French Electoral Panel, organised by the
CEVIFOP33 follows the long tradition of post-electoral surveys that have been taking place in
France since 1978. The purpose of these surveys is to better understand the voting behaviour of
French citizens following elections.
The 2002 Electoral Panel consists of three waves; the ﬁrst wave took place right before the
Presidential Election ﬁrst round (8-20/4); the second between the Presidential Election second
round and the Legislative Election (15-21/5); the third took place after the Legislative Election
(20-28/6). Given the surprising 2002 Presidential Election ﬁrst-round results, questions on the
JM Le Pen discourse were included in the second wave of the survey.
The second wave of the 2002 French electoral panel contains socio-demographic informations,
and most importantly, the municipality where the respondents live. The survey consists of 4,017
individuals. Of those, 287 come from the regions annexed by the Germans during WWII, from
52 diﬀerent municipalities.
The question concerning the ERW discourse (Q232) is phrased in the following way: Do you
approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le Pen on: (a) Immigrants, (b) Security, (c)
The defence of traditional values, (d) The critique against the political class, (e) The suppression
of income tax, (f) The exit of France from the EU. There are four possible answers to this
question: totally approve, rather approve, rather disapprove, and totally disapprove.
33Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po.
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Figure 4: Proposed Mechanism: Le Pen Positions and War Exposure
Note: Correlation between relative approval of Le Pen positions and relative war exposure at the municipality level.
Data on approval of Le Pen's positions comes from the 2002 French Electoral Panel (CEVIFOP). Data on war exposure
comes from comes from the Index of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces. Reference municipality is
Strasbourg.
The estimation strategy used to relate the survey to the historical data follows Algan and
Cahuc (2010). I start by constructing an approval indicator that takes the value 1 if the respon-
dent answered "I totally approve" or "I rather approve" for each of the six Le Pen positions. By
doing so I make a separation between respondents that are more or less in favour of a Le Pen
position from the ones that are more or less against it. This also simpliﬁes interpretation of the
coeﬃcients of regressions.
At a second step, I run regressions of the six constructed indicators on municipality ﬁxed
eﬀects, age-gender groups, education (to approximate income), religion (to approximate origin),
and most importantly 2002 Round 2 vote ﬁxed eﬀects. I then create a new variable using the
municipality ﬁxed eﬀect coeﬃcient. This variable captures the approval of Le Pen's positions
in municipality m relative to the reference municipality, conditional on covariates. These con-
structed variables are then combined with the historical and administrative data34.
Figure 4 presents the correlation between the approval of Le Pen's position on the six diﬀerent
34All variables in the historical and administrative data are transformed with respect to the reference munici-
pality as well.
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Table 7: Proposed Mechanism: OLS Estimates for Le Pen's Positions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: Approve/disapprove of position taken by JM Le Pen on
Immigration Security Tradition Criticism Taxes EU
Exposed (%) 0.039 0.048 0.049 0.064** 0.022 0.029
(0.033) (0.030) (0.040) (0.031) (0.032) (0.022)
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreigners' fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Blue collar workers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 50 50 48 49 49
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.02
Variance explained 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.30 0.11 0.18
Notes: OLS estimates of the eﬀect of war exposure on approval of Le Pen's positions All regressions run at the municipality
level. Reference municipality is Strasbourg. Column (1): Do you approve or disapprove of the position taken by JM Le
Pen on immigrants? Column (2): on security? Column (3): on the defence of traditional values? Column (4): on the
critique against the political class? Column (5): on the suppression of income tax? Column (6): on the exit of France
from the EU? Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. Variance explained is the
estimate resulting from a regression analysis that has been standardized so that the variances of dependent and independent
variables are 1.
topics and war exposure, relative to Strasbourg. As shown in this Figure, the only Le Pen position
that appears correlated with war exposure is his position on "the critique against the political
class".
To test whether this correlation is driven by systematic diﬀerences in municipalities charac-
teristics, I run regressions on the approval of the diﬀerent Le Pen positions on War exposure.
Given the small sample size, I restrict the control variables to population density (to capture
urbanization), foreigners' fraction, blue collar workers' fraction and the unemployment rate.
The results presented in Table 7 conﬁrm that only the critical aspect of the Le Pen discourse is
correlated with war exposure. A 1 percentage point increase in exposure (relative to Strasbourg)
leads to a 0.06 percentage point increase in approval of Le Pen's criticism of the political class.
The other positions of the ERW candidate are uncorrelated to war exposure.
Overall, these results indicate that the driving force between the increased support for the
extreme right-wing in the regions where men were incorporated in the Wehrmacht is the anti-
establishment rhetoric of its candidate. In the small sample with available data, a 1 s.d. increase
in war exposure relative to Strasbourg (s.d. = 1.8) can explain up to 30% of the variation in
approval of Le Pen's criticism (s.d. = 0.39).
If this correlation indeed captures low diﬀuse support resulting from the military war exposure
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Table 8: Proposed Mechanism: OLS Estimates for Trust in Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Variable: Do you rather trust or mistrust the following institutions
Police Army State Assembly Justice Parties
Exposed (%) 0.032 0.068** 0.023 0.008 0.072** 0.040*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.039) (0.047) (0.030) (0.021)
Population density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Foreigners' fraction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Blue collar workers Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.12
Variance explained 0.17 0.52 0.10 0.04 0.30 0.22
Notes: OLS estimates of the eﬀect of war exposure on approval of Le Pen's positions All regressions run at the municipality
level. Reference municipality is Strasbourg. Column (1): Do you rather trust or mistrust the police? Column (2): the army?
Column (3): the State? Column (4): the National assembly? Column (5): justice? Column (6): political parties? Robust
standard errors in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. Variance explained is the estimate resulting
from a regression analysis that has been standardized so that the variances of dependent and independent variables are 1.
of men from these regions, it should also be captured by questions measuring trust in institutions.
The 2002 French Electoral Panel also includes questions on trust in the police, the army, the
state, the assembly, the judicial system, and parties.
Results from running regressions using the exact same approach as approval of the radical
right wing candidate's opinions are presented in Table 8. Consistently with the mechanism
proposed, individuals from places where more men were exposed to war are less trustful of (non-
total) institutions, such as the judicial system and parties. On the other hand, they are more
trustful of hierarchical institutions such as the police and the army.
4.4 Other potential mechanisms
In the last part of this Section I test whether other characteristics of the radical right discourse
correlate with war exposure. I start by testing whether forced conscription led to a need to
overcompensate the national belonging of inhabitants from these regions. After ﬁghting on the
German side of the War, men from these regions might feel the need to prove to the rest of the
country that they were highly attached to the French nation. If that was the case, there should
be an increased support for candidates with a more traditionalist and nationalist discourse. As
shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 12, there does not appear to be a systematic diﬀerence
in support for candidates that have a stronger anti-universal discourse.
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In Columns (3) and (4) I test whether I am capturing a taste for the military. As a total,
hierarchically organized institution, the military socializes its members into authoritarian modes
(Jenning and Markus, 1977). Le Pen, the president of the National Front, was a veteran of the
Indochina and Algeria wars. It could therefore be the case that war veterans relate more with
him on this dimension than with other candidates. Furthermore, the authoritarian aspect of
radical right-wing parties is a constant feature of these parties across Europe (Schwengler, 2003).
As shown in Table 12 in the Appendix, neither increased positive mentions to the military, nor
positive mentions to law and order systematically correlate with war exposure.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I provide evidence that war participation has a long-run impact on political
behaviour, in the context of the annexation of the French Eastern Borderlands by the Third
Reich during WWII, and the consequent forcible conscription of men from these regions to the
Wehrmacht. Using data on soldiers from these regions whose fate remained unknown right after
the War had ended, I construct a measure of military war exposure at the municipality level.
Localities where more men where exposed to WWII conﬂict still display today increased electoral
support for radical right-wing candidates.
Within district OLS estimates indicate that war exposure can explain up to 10% of the
variation in this voting behaviour. To establish a causal relationship between exposure and voting
I take advantage of a discontinuity in the conscription rule. 2SLS estimates from comparing
municipalities with a common cultural background within 10km from each other conﬁrm the
OLS estimates.
Evidence implies that this eﬀect is driven from reduced diﬀuse political support, also known
as political alienation. Since the 1960s, candidates that have been more critical towards the
political system have received increased political support in these localities. Survey data re-
gressions conﬁrm this ﬁnding. Even after controlling for political orientation, individuals from
municipalities more exposed agree on average more with the radical right-wing candidate on his
critique of political classes.
These ﬁndings indicate that particular attention should be held on the demobilization and
re-integration process of ex-combatants, particularly after participation in a war that has been
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criticized as being unjust and vicious. Several questions on the topic remain however unan-
swered. Political alienation is typically considered to be a combination of personal ineﬃcacy
(one's perception of being unable to inﬂuence desired political outcomes), system ineﬃcacy (one's
perception that the political system as a whole is thwarting his value satisfaction), and value
conﬂict (the conﬂict between the individual's fundamental values and those represented by the
polity) (Schwartz, 1973). Understanding further which of these components is most aﬀected by
the traumatizing experience of participating in a war can reﬁne policy prescription.
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Figure 5: Index Data: Men Declared Missing by Municipality
Note: Map of the fraction of men declared missing in the Bas-Rhin and Moselle departments. Data comes from the Index
of French Nationals Compelled into German Armed Forces. Fraction of men declared missing calculated using the 1936
oﬃcial population census. French belt refers to municipalities with a dialect of French origin. Municipality limits valid as
of Jan 1, 2014.
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Figure 6: Baseline Specification: 1936 Districts
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Figure 7: Baseline Specification: 1936 Sub-Districts
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Figure 8: Baseline Specification: Dialect Origin
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Figure 9: Instrumental Variables: 15km Grids
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Figure 10: Instrumental Variables: Dialects
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Figure 11: Instrumental Variables: 2SLS Coefficients by Sub-Sample
Note: Graph of the 2SLS estimates of the eﬀects of WWII exposure on extreme-right wing vote in the 2002 presidential
election second round when varying the distance from the discontinuity border. 2SLS Coeﬃcient is the point estimate by
sub-sample. Distance from the Border (km) is the maximum distance from the discontinuity to include a municipality in the
restricted sample. Range plot indicates the conﬁdence intervals, capped at the 10% signiﬁcance level. All regressions run at
the municipality level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the sub-district (canton) level. All regressions
include the full set of controls of Equation (4), with the exception of Pre-War covariates vector that consists of Returnees
not drafted (%), Geographical endowments, and Population density.
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B Tables
Table 9: Summary Statistics: Pre-War Characteristics
Summary Statistics Corr.
Obs Mean Std.dev. Exposure p-value
WWII Exposure
Exposed to War (%) 1634 5.27 3.45 1.00 1.00
- of whom drafted 1634 5.08 3.40 0.99 0.00
- of whom not drafted 1634 0.19 0.38 0.23 0.00
Geographical endowments
Latitude 1634 48.64 0.53 0.13 0.00
Longitude 1634 7.07 0.51 0.03 0.27
Waterway (Binary) 1634 0.20 0.40 0.02 0.54
Elevation 1634 281.07 129.02 0.01 0.77
Elevation std.dev. 1634 35.00 43.10 0.01 0.77
Sociocultural aspects
Protestant (%) 1634 13.88 19.31 0.05 0.07
Jewish (%) 1634 0.85 0.53 0.03 0.22
French-speaking (%) 1634 62.80 18.69 0.05 0.05
German-speaking (%) 1634 73.49 17.69 0.08 0.00
Dialect-speaking only (%) 1634 5.78 3.64 0.03 0.21
Ideological preferences
Right wing (%) 1634 75.89 17.01 0.03 0.17
Extreme-right wing (%) 1634 16.62 18.89 0.04 0.12
Notes: Pre-War municipality characteristics descriptives. Correlation with Exposure is the within district and dialect
origin correlation with Exposed to War (%). WWII Exposure data comes from the Index of French Nationals Compelled
into German Armed Forces. Exposed (%), Exposed of whom drafted (%), and Exposed of whom not drafted (%) constructed
by inﬂating Declared missing (%) by 1/θ, where θ = 44, 000/100, 000 = 0.44. Geographical endowments data comes from
the European Environment Agency. Elevation and Elevation std.dev. in metres. Waterway (Binary) takes the value 1
when a river or canal crosses the municipality limits and 0 otherwise. Sociocultural aspects data comes from the Aspects
particuliers des populations alsacienne et mosellane and Carte de Cassini, EHESS. Protestant (%) and Jewish (%) in
1936. French-speaking (%) and German-speaking (%) is the fraction of the population speaking French and German in
1936. Dialect-speaking only (%) is the fraction of the population speaking exclusively the dialect (no oﬃcial language) in
1936. Ideological preferences data comes from the oﬃcial 1936 parliamentary election results. Right wing (%) and Extreme-
right wing (%) candidates classiﬁed based on Dreyfus (1969) and Zanoun (2009). Sociocultural aspects and Ideological
preferences available at the sub-district (canton) level only.
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Table 10: Summary Statistics: Contemporary Characteristics (2002)
Summary Statistics Corr.
Obs Mean Std.dev. Exposure p-value
Demographic characteristics
Population density 1634 175.69 360.16 0.01 0.69
Population Growth (%) 1634 40.97 101.46 0.01 0.64
Foreigners (%) 1634 3.94 4.59 0.06 0.02
Socioeconomic aspects
Admin. remoteness 1634 3.60 1.22 0.01 0.80
Service remoteness 1634 3.18 1.32 0.00 0.86
Unemployment rate (%) 1634 5.88 4.83 0.02 0.39
Blue collar workers (%) 1634 40.41 13.34 0.11 0.00
No schooling degree (%) 1634 22.28 9.11 0.08 0.00
Secondary schooling (%) 1634 23.50 8.50 0.12 0.00
Electoral outcomes
Radical-right wing (%) 1634 22.64 5.72 0.13 0.00
Notes: Contemporary municipality characteristics descriptives. Correlation with Exposure is the within district and dialect
origin correlation with Exposed to War (%). Data comes from the 1999 census organised by the French National Statistics
and Economic Studies Institute (INSEE), except for Fertility rate (average of 2003-2011), Foreigners (%) (2006), Median
income (2002), and Electoral outcomes (2002R2). Population Growth (%) measured as the change from 1936 to 1999 over
the 1936 population. Fertility rate is the average annual number of births for 2003-2011 by childbearing women (aged 15-49
y.o.). When no childbearing women a 0 is attributed. The deﬁnition of a foreigners by the statistical oﬃce is a person
residing France that does not have the French nationality. Administrative remoteness takes the values from 0 to 12. It is
constructed using the Remoteness (2001) methodology, where administrative centres are given values 1 to 4, with 1 being the
head of a sub-district and 4 the head of a region. Service remoteness constructed using the same methodology; population
thresholds chosen as the 95th percentile of the respective administrative group population. In 1999 these thresholds are:
2623, 15026, 40907, 103605. Blue collar workers (%) is the fraction of workforce working in agriculture and industrial
labourers; No schooling degree (%) is the fraction of the population over 16 y.o. without any schooling degree; Secondary
schooling (%) holding a Baccalaurreat (Bac) or University degree. Median income in Euros. Radical-right wing (%) is the
vote share of Le Pen in the 2002R2 presidential election.
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Table 11: Instrumental Variables: Discontinuity Sample Comparability
Diﬀerence in means (Alsace minus Moselle)
Proximity measure Geographical Geographical Cultural & Cultural &
Geographical Geographical
WWII Exposure
Exposed (%) 2.995*** 2.995*** 2.961*** 2.980***
Geographical endowments
Latitude 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004
Longitude 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.037***
Elevation 0.859 0.859 1.041 1.775
Elevation std.dev. 5.649*** 5.649*** 5.725*** 5.195***
Waterway (Binary) 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.008
Demographic characteristics
Population density 22.828** 22.828** 23.251** 23.985*
Population Growth (%) 10.168 10.168 10.417 10.011
Foreigners (%) 0.122 0.122 0.140 0.109
Socioeconomic aspects
Admin. remoteness 0.041 0.041 0.033 0.007
Service remoteness 0.029 0.029 0.025 0.012
No schooling degree (%) 0.490 0.490 0.445 0.147
Secondary schooling (%) 0.615 0.615 0.558 0.837
Blue collar workers (%) 1.155 1.155 1.360 1.520
Unemployment rate (%) 0.557 0.557 0.588 0.587
Median income 185.817 185.817 191.154 272.092
Electoral outcomes
Radical-right wing (%) 1.518 1.518 1.439 1.370
Observations 1634 482 482 212
Notes: Diﬀerence in means of observable characteristics of municipalities in Alsace and Moselle. All diﬀerences include grid
and dialect FE to preserve locality. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) sample includes all municipalities
from Alsace and Moselle; Columns (2) & (3) within 20km; Column (4) within 10km. Discontinuity sub-samples constructed
as described in Figure 6. 15km Grid, and Dialect F.E. presented in Figures 9, and 10 in the Appendix. All variables
constructed as described in Tables 8 and 9. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Table 12: Proposed Mechanism: 2SLS Estimates for Other Programme Aspects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. Variable: Vote Share (%): Discourse> median
Nationalism Tradition Military Law & Order
Proximity measure Cultural & Geographical
1965 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 1.105*** 1.105*** 1.105*** 2.341***
(0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.633)
1995 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 1.932*** 1.932*** 0.946** 1.932***
(0.504) (0.504) (0.445) (0.504)
2002 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 0.074 1.164*** 0.927*** 0.927***
(0.243) (0.390) (0.183) (0.183)
2007 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 0.298** 0.165 0.385*** 0.255**
(0.132) (0.264) (0.083) (0.117)
2012 Presidential Election
Exposed (%) 0.022 0.335 0.022 0.022
(0.169) (0.229) (0.169) (0.169)
Geographical endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contemp. cov. vector Yes Yes Yes Yes
15km Grid F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dialect origin F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dialect F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample restrictions 10km 10km 10km 10km
Observations 212 212 212 212
Notes: 2SLS estimates of the eﬀect of Second World War exposure on support for candidates with above the median
mentions of speciﬁc topics in the 1965 to 2012 Presidential Election ﬁrst rounds. Each coeﬃcient is the 2SLS estimate of
a separate regression. The dependent variable is the sum of votes for candidates with above the median mentions of the
respective topic in their manifesto. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the sub-district level. All regressions
include all municipalities within 10km from Alsace and Moselle border. Discontinuity sub-samples constructed as described
in Figure 6. All regressions include the full set of controls of Equation (4). with the exception of Pre-War covariates vector.
All variables constructed as described in Tables 9 and 10. Dialect origin, 15km Grid, and Dialect F.E. presented in Figures
8, 9, and 10 in the Appendix. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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